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(Carter & Choy, CJJ., 
& Solomon, DJ.) 
Federal/Civil 
Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs claim that the Government did 
not reserve ground water rights when it withdrew Devil's 
DISCUSS 
Hole from the public domain in 1952, and that to permit the 
Government to do so now would conflict with the right of 
the various Western States to control the disposition of water 
within their jurisdictions. 
2. FACTS: In 1906, Congress passed an act for the 
protection of American antiquities; in 1933, Death Valley 
( 
- 2 -
National Monument was created under the provisions of that 
act, thereby withdrawing that area from the public domain. 
In 1952, President Truman, by proclamation, withdrew "a 
remarkable underground pool known as Devil's Hole and 
the 40 acres surrounding it . . . from the public domain and 
established [it] as a detached portion of Death Valley 
National Monument." The pool in Devil' s Hole was and is of 
interest because it is the sole natural habitat of a "peculiar 
race of desert fish" known as pupfish, ., In 1966, Congress first 
•.we 
legislated to protect "endangered species" of animals and in 
1970 pupfish were officially declared to b~ an endangered 
species. In 1968, petrs, having recently acquired a large tract 
of land near Devil's Hole, began to pump underground water on 
their land for use in irrigation of their cultivated land, now 
about 4,000 acres; shortly thereaft~r the water level in Devil's 
Hole began to drop, partially exposing a rock shelf on which the 
pupfish were feeding and reproducing. The Government initiated 
an action to enjoin further pumping until such time as the ,court 
.. 
could determine, through a Master, the lowest level of water 
acceptable for Devil's Hole consistent with the preservation of 
the pupfish. Through somewhat protracted litigation, the 
District Court concluded that a certain level was required; petrs 
claim that the maintenance of that level will, in effect, put 
them out of business. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs claim that certain 19th century 





public domain and the silence of the 1952 proclamation on 
the question of reservation of water rights at Devil's Hole 
prevent the drawing of an inference that the 1952 proclamation 
was intended to reserve the water rights for the Government. 
Based on the assumed correctness of this contention, petrs argue 
that they were essentially first in time in claiming the water 
under state law because the Government has otherwise never 
sought to perfect any claim to the water under state law, and 
its only assertion of a claim must be the declaration of the 
pupfish as an endangered species .in 1970, two years after petrs 
began to pump the water. (This claim appears to be based on a 
common law right to the water, a right that was abolished by 
Nevada in 1939.) Petrs also contend that the Proclamation 
./ issued in 1952 had nothing to do with pupfish, because there was 
no legislation in effect at that time protecting endangered 
species and that therefore the Government should not be permitted 
to read into the Proclamation more than was there. (This ap-
pears to be petrs' first contention in different dress.) P~trs 
finally contend that the only way to reserve water rights in 
Nevada is to follow the state procedures, that the Government is 
bound to follow state procedures and has not done so, and that 
therefore the Government's claim must fail. 
3. DISCUSSION: Petrs' first two contentions turn on 
the proper interpretation of the 1952 Proclamation and the 
proper construction of the 1906 Act upon which the Proclamation 
was based. The CA held that the application of the "reservation" 
•,,: 
4 -
doctrine -- the power of the Government to reserve, free 
from state law, water rights for itself where public lands 
are withdrawn from the public domain -- was within this 
Court's decisions in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, and 
United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 
520. This was so, said theCA, because the implied reservation 
of the water rights in this case was required to accomplish the 
purposes for which the land was reserved. The third contention 
made by petrs would appear to be controlled by Federal Power 
Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, which held that the Government 
does not have to comply with state law when reserving water on 
such lando Petrs seek to distinguish these cases by arguing that 
they involved surface water as opposed to ground water, but that 
distinction would seem to be of no force, since the focus of the 
relevant cases is upon the Government's being able to achieve 
whatever purpose it set out to achieve. According to scholarly 
authority relied on by petrs, there have been several attempts in 
Congress to reverse this Court's acceptance of the implied ; ~ 
.~....- . 
reservation doctrine, all of which have failed. 47 Den. L.J., at 
203-204. This problem would appear to be one more congenial to 
1/ 
the halls of Congress • -
There is a response. 
5/6/75 Simms CA 9 Opinion in Petn. 
2/ 
\ 
- This case presents no issue remotely related to the abstention 
issue presented in Colorado River Water District v. Unit e d Sta t es , 
No. 74-940, cert o granted, April 28, 1975, this case involvi ng a 
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Cert. to CA 9 Timely 
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 1. This petition seeks review 
~~issue in No. 74-1107, Cappaert v. United States. It is filed by 
(.&g._.~ 
~J the intervenor state of Nevada, and has a somewhat different focus 
tJ~ '1 f-tJ-o) from that of the Cappaerts . It is thus necessary to write an 
~ ()._ 
additional memo. The issues involve the ;xtent t,? which th.5;. 
\):',- (U~-~ ~~-~ hr.ic_ C' A-1-. j j: - + {fr- taoJ a::l.t.t:t ~d._ '-f~~ · 
q- ~~- ~t  GlU_  t ~9 ~'Tk ~~ c{ ~ VV'-u.lu_ --fl.~~ 
-w~  ~ A-U-~  .:J:: w-J_f_ ---~..~ , p~ 
-2-
implied reservation doctrine may frustrate the power of arid 
~ ~~----------
~tat~s to administer their own scarce . underground water 
resources, and whether the McCarran Amendment, 43 u.s.c. § 666(a), 
requires the federal government to comply with state procedures 
for administering groundwater. 
2. FACTS: Aside from the facts set forth in the Preliminary 
Memo for No. 74-1107, which should be consulted, it is relevant 
that prior to filing of this federal action the Cappaerts had 
instituted a state proceeding for appropriation of groundwater. 
The United States protested the application, and fully participated 
( in the hearing (before ~he State Engineer) • The State Engineer 
rendered a decision to issue permits to the Cappaerts, and this 
decision was not appealed by the United States. 
3. CONTENTIONS AND CA OPINION: Petr echoes the arguments 
presented by the Cappaerts that federal statutes long ago severed ~ , 
control of water from federal ownership of public lands, leaving 
such control to the states. Pursuant to this authority, petr had 
devised procedures for establishing rights in water, procedures 
which are as open to the u.s. government as to any other land 
owner. The implied reservation doctrine, as applied in this case, 
completely undermines petr's authority and procedures, for it 
permits the United States to re-establish control over water 
rights by simply withdrawing critical portions of land from the 
public domain. This is especially troublesome with regard to 
'· 
( -3-
' ; underground water, since the water under any particular piece 
of land is often hydrologically connected with reservoirs 
covering hundreds of square miles. TheCA dismissed petr's 
claim to control of underground water with the statement that 
state water laws do not apply to lands withdrawn from the 
public domain, citing F.P.C. v. Oregon, 349 u.s. 435, 444, 448 
(1955). Petr contends that Oregon should not control, because 
it made the distinction between public domain and reserved 
land without discussion, and because the decision in that case 
could have been grounded on provisions of the Federal Power 
(~ Act which explicitly st~ted that certain land and appurtenant 
waters should be used for power generation (there was thus no 
need to imply a reservation of water rights) • Petr goes on to 
argue that cases applying the implied reservation doctrine 
have on their facts been based on necessity (for power generatio~, , 
' 
for effectuating Congressional enactments for the national defense, 
and for providing a living for resettled Indians), rather than on 
ownership of water arising from ownership of land. They claim 
that the present result works a "demonstrable injustice," suggest-
ing that the extinction of man is of greater importance than the 
extinction of desert pupfish. 
The SG contends that the implied reservation theory is well 
established, poir.ting to language in Eagle County, 401 u.s., at 
522-523, and Arizona v. Calif ornia, 373 U.S. 546, 597-602 (1 963 ), 
-~ ··~ 11 ....,,... ~,.., flrc.rrrm ~nn TIIT inr r>r~ V. U.S •. 207 U.S. 564 (19 0 8 ), 
( -4-
Petr contends that water rights have been left to the states 
to control, through a single, comprehensive system of administration 
and adjudication. It especially relies on the McCarran Amendment, 
43 u.s.c. § 666, which waives sovereign immunity as to state 
proceedings for the adjudication and administration of water rights. 
The CA treated the Amendment as being no more than what it purports 
to be, a waiver of immunity from suit, and not as a limitation on 
the fora available to the United States. It relied on u.s. v. 
I Nevada, 412 u.s. 534, 538 (1973), which noted that a federal district court had jurisdiction to hear a water rights case brought by the 
"----' ( United States. Petr contends that the CA gave inadequate considera-
' 
tion to u.s. v. District Ct. for Eagle County, 401 u.s. 520 (1971), 
and u.s. v. District Ct. for Division No. 5, 401 u.s. 527 (1971), 
which held that claims to reserved water rights could be litigated 
in state courts, subject to this Court's review of federal questions. 
According to petr, these cases recognize the desirability of a 
single, expert system for water rights determinations, and rigid 
reliance on the statutory term "defendant" should not be allmved 
to undermine that approach. 
- ',.. . 
Seven states have filed two similar amicus briefs in support 
the petn. Aside from expressing fear that the decision imperils 
their existence, they raise three points. First, they contend 
that President Truman did not have statutory authority to reserve 




was intended to protect places and inanimate things, not wildlife, 
and congressional history indicates that it was to be used sparingly, 
taking only such land as "absolutely necessary"). Second, the 
reservation doctrine should not be extended to percolating ground-
water, since this would affect the right of adjacent landowners to 
withdraw water to which they were entitled under state law. Whereas 
surface water could have been obvious to Congress at the time it 
withdrew public lands, such cannot be said for groundwater. Moreover, 
the effect of groundwater removal may not be obvious for years, 
during which time the adjacent landowner may well have made very 
substantial good faith .investments; thus application of implied 
reservation theory, rather than reliance on the emminent domain 
power, could be "unconscionable." 
Third, the amici raise a contention which is reserved by Nevada, 
but not discussed -- that the u.s. is barred by collateral estoppel 
arising from the unappealed state administrative proceeding. Having 
intervened in the state proceedings, the United States was stuck 
with them (subject to this Court's review of federal questions), 
even though it had not been formally served as a party defendant. 
The CA rejected this contention on the grounds the state proceeding 
was merely administrative in nature, the McCarran Amendment did 
not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity save for proceedings 
in which the U.S. was a defendant, and the rights of the u.s. were 
not in issue since it appeared merely to explain the factual 
~~a~a nF i~~ nnnnsi~inn to the Cacnaert ' s application. 
-6-
4. DISCUSSION: Questions regarding the Antiquities Act and 
the Truman proclamation are probably too narrow to merit review, 
absent some indication that this might be a recurring problem 
(the reach of those documents is highly relevant to this case, 
however, for the implied reservation doctrine is a matter of 
congressional intent) • The issues dealing with administration 
of western groundwater strike me as somewhat more substantial. 
The CA opinion is certainly plausible and defensible. But 
there are some substantial reasons for distinguishing between 
surface water and groundwater, and the combination of the 
'-
\ severance of control over water on public lands and the waiver 
of immunity in state proceedings suggests that Congress intends 
western water rights to be administered in comprehensive fashion 
by the respective states, at least to the extent of binding the 
United States to the results of proceedings in which it enters 
an appearance. Moreover, amicus briefs indicate that theCA's 
decision may represent a very substantial and unpredictable 
encroachment upon the authority of the states to ration a vital 
and scarce resource. 
There is a response in No. 74-1107. 
6/11/75 Jacobs CA opn in petn app. 
THE McCARRAN AMENDMENT, 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) 
Con:')cnt is given to join the United States as a de-
fendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights 
to the use of water of a river system or other source, 
or (2) for the administration of such rights, where 
is appears that the United States is the owner of or 
is in the process of acqui1'1ng water rights by appro-
priation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, 
or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary 
party to such suit. The United States, when a party 
to such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any 
right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or 
that the U nitcd States is not amenable thereto by 
reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to 
the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having 
jurisclietion, and may obtain rcview thereof, in the 
same maru1er and to the same extent as a private indi-
vidual under l'iko circnmstancrs: Provided, That no 
judgmrnt for costs shall he entrrcd again:')t the United 
States in :my such suit. 
-
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO FROM PENNY CLARK ~ fV''l:) 7 ~- / 3> t>L{ 
No. 74-940 presents the following issue: whether a 
federal court should abstain ianast:tiaai:ai. &@! in an action brought 
by the United States to adjudicate water rights, deferring to 
the State's comprehensive machinery for adjudicating and 
administering rights to scarce water resources. That is not --the same issue presented in 74-1304 and 74-1107, although one 
issue raised by 73-1304 is close. The primary issue in this 
pair of cases is whether the implied reservation doctrine 
(which ._ turns on congressional intent to reserve water rights 
along with land) should apply (a) to underground water, or (b) 
in states that have machinery for adjudicating water rights 
between competi~laimants. By themselves these issues .... 
I£&2£@1& offer no strong reason for reversing the decision below; 
I suspect they both would be answered in the affirmative if 
taken on the merits. The petition in 73-1304, however, raises 
another issue: whether the United States, having participated --------
in a state adjudication of water rights, should be bound by 
that decision, or may later institute its own action in &L&ba: 
.._.federal court for adjudication of its rights under feqe~al 
law. This issue is a close relative to that in 74-940; the 
broad question is the same (how to reconcile federal water 
claims with state apportionment systems) , but in one the question 
is how the federal court should act, and in the other it is 
what effect the state proceeding should have on the federal 
"' ... SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO FROM PENNY CLARK 
No. 74-940 presents the following issue: whether a 
federal court should abstain iaaamiaaizi. @§ in an action brought 
by the United States to adjudicate water rights, deferring to 
the State's comprehensive machinery for adjudicating and 
administering rights to scarce water resources. That is not --the same issue presented in 74-1304 and 74-1107, although one 
issue raised by 73-1304 is close. The primary issue in this 
pair of cases is whether the implied reservation doctrine 
(which ._ turns on congressional intent to reserve water rights 
along with land) should apply (a) to underground water, or (b) 
in states that have machinery for adjudicating water rights 
between competi~laimants. By themselves these issues .... 
nanga offer no strong reason for reversing the decision below; 
I suspect they both would be answered in the affirmative if 
taken on the merits. The petition in 73-1304, however, raises 
another issue: whether the United States, having participated ---------
in a state adjudication of water rights, should be bound by 
' ,. 
that decision, or may later institute its own action in aaats 
~ federal court for adjudication of its rights under federal 
law. This issue is a close relative to that in 74-940; the 
broad question is the same (how to reconcile federal water 
claims with state apportionment systems), but in one the question 
is how the federal court should act, and in the other it is 






The decision in 74-940 will not dictate the outcome 
in these petitions, although it might .... be close enough 
to warrant holding these petitions and remanding to the 
, for reconsideration, 
Court of Appea1s7following decision in t 74-940. Or, if • 
you want to devote the time to two cases (more economicalf'"6-"·;f~i"'ti 
..f.wo d.A.ssi ~llr& c.ac;e..s... c_Q._ne or both of , 
A of course)) since the it1an:es &IS similailfthese pet1f1ons 
could be granted and set for argument with 74-940. If this 
is the favored course, I would grant No. 74-1304, which 
more closely presents the "res judicata" issue, and hold 
74-1107. I would also ask the parties to brief the question 
of what effect participation in the state~~ .... ~£ .. proceeding 
should have (or perhaps .. even limit the grant to that issue). 
11 htw If 74-1304 is granted, nothing would be '81•• 
gained by granting 74-1107 along with it. 
{ 
The decision whether to grant, hold, or deny is a 
' c~ne. Perhaps •one of the most persuasive factors 
should be the current state of the Court's docket for next 
Term: whether it is such that you can afford the luxury 
of having two related cases, or whether you should take only 
one and hope to resolve the basic question of conflict 
between federal claims and state adjudicatory machinery. 
penny 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
- t} J'-f 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Greg Palm DATE: October 31, 1975 
Nos. 74-1107 & 74-1304 CAppaert v. United States["Pupfish"] 
I had hoped to finish this memo prior to argument. But I 
still have not had time to consider fully the res judicata issues. 
As to those my initial impression was that CA 9 was correct and 
that the Government Brief contains several bases upon which CA 9's 
decis·i on on that score might be affirmed. 
On the"tre rits" I think the decision be low should be affirmed. 
I. Federal Reservation Doctrine: 
The prior decisions of this Court establish that 
b~rese~v~~blic lands the United States may also reserve such 
appurtenant unappropriated waters as are necessary to accomplish 
the purposes for which the reservation was created. Arizona v. 
California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-602 (1963); United States v. Powers, 
305 U.S. 527, 528 (1939); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 
575-78 (1908). Two factors are determinative in the assessment 
of whether the United States has established a prior claim to a 
particular water source: (1) Intent: it must be shown that 
the United States intended to reserve certain water rights when it 
reserved theretofore public lands, and (2) Necessity: the 
appurtenant water rights reserved must be necessary to serve 
the future requirements of the reserved land. As will be 
developed below I think that although this is a relatively --"easy" case in terms of the necessity branch of the doctrine, 
it is important that the Court establish an ascertainable 
standard by which competing private water users can estimate 
the amounts of water the United States may validly claim in 
2. 
the future as required for the development of the reserved public 
land. Otherwise, an unnecessary amount of uncertainty will be 
created so that investment development in Western States may be 
unfairly impeded. 
Prior to engaging in the intent/necessity analysis 
that is vital to the resolution of reserved water-rights cases, 
two contentions relating to whether the doctrine should be 
inapplicable to non-Indian reserved rights and the potentially 
1< 
differentiable role of underground water will be examined. 
t 
* The S.G.'s Brief adequately deals with petitioners' 
1 
contention that as to non-navigable water state law, rather than 
federal law, should determine the federal water right. Brief for 
United States 25-30. This contention is premised on an 
interpretation of the Desert Land Act of 1877, 19 Stat. 377, 43 
U.S.C. § 321, and its statutory predecessors. The contention 
previously has been rejected by the Court, see FPC v. Oregon, 
349 U.S. 435 (1955), and petitioners have raiSea-no persuasive 
reason why it should not be rejected ~gain. 
3. 
Petitioners in part argue that the implied reservation doctrine is 
properly applicable only in circumstances involving Indian 
lands. This contention, in its broadest form, can be rejected 
rather summarily. In Arizona v. California, supra, at 601, 
';~ 
seven Justices apparently agreed with the conclusion of the 
Master that the reservption doctrine is applicable to all 
federal establishments, not just Indian reservations: 
The Master ruled that the principle under-
lying the reservation of wat er rights for Indian 
Reservations was equally applicable to other 
federal establishments such as National Recreation 
Areas and National Forests. We agree that the 
United States intended to reserve water sufficient 
for the future requirements of the Lake Mead 
National Recreation Area, the Havasu Lake National 
Wildlife Refuge, the Imperial National Wildlife 
Refuge and the Gila National Forest. 
See also Federal Power Comm'n. v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 438, 448 
** ~ (1955). Moreover, notwithstanding precident, there would appear 
to be no persuasive reason for limiting the doctrine solely to ----
Indian lands. The doctrine is based on the need for the 
* See 373 U.S. at 602; 603; 627. The Chief Justice ' 
took no part in the case. Justice Douglas dissented and did not 
reach this question. Justices Harlan and Stewart, although 
dissenting in part, joined this portion of the Court's opinion. 
•~ Eight justices apparently shared a similar view in United 
States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 522-523(1971 
It is clear from our cases that the United States often has 
reserved water rights based on withdrawals from the public domain 
As we said in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, the Federal 
Government had the authority both before and after a State is 
aQmitted into the Union "to reserve waters for the use and benefi 
of federally reserved lands." Id. at 597. The federally 
reserved lands include any fede~l enclave. In Arizona v. 
Ca.lifornia, we were primarily concerned with Indian reservations. 
Td. at 398-601. The reservation of waters may be only implied 
and the amount will reflect the nature of the federal enclave. 
Id. at 600-601. 
Justice Harlan joined the opinion of the Court but "explicitly 
disclaim[ed] ... the intimation of any view as to the existence 
and scope of the so-called "reserved water rights" of the u.s., 
either ~n general or in the particular situations involved here. 
{ 
4. 
otherwise unappropriated water to accomplish the purposes 
underlying the reservation of the public land. For example, 
the reservation of public land, in an arid region, but through 
which passes several non-navigable streams, for use as a 
national park may be senseless unless there is an implied 
reservation of the water rights appurtenant to that land. 
Petitioner Nevada and several amici states contend that 
the reserved water right doctrine should not be "extended" to 
underground water. Nevada's only significant point with 
regard to this proposed distinction is the fact that the 
reservation of underground water rights is potentially harsher 
on the competing water users since it is more difficult to 
determine with any precision the sources and movement of 
groundwater. Moreover, as a consequence of this greater 
uncertainty private parties will be less willing to invest in 
the arid West in any project which requires a predictable supply 
of uninterrupted water since at some point in the future the 
reservation doctrine may be used to usurp its water rights. 
This is clearly a significant concern. After considering a 
I number of competing factors, however, I have concluded that it would be inappropriate to limit the reservation doctrine solely 
to surface water. First, the reservation doctrine appears to 
* This, of course, is not to say that reserved 
water rights in the context of Indian lands will not be treated 
differently from federal water rights in other contextx. Cf. 
Brief for United States 21 n. 13 and sources cited therein.--
: 
5. 
be based on the need of the reservation, not the character of 
the water reserved. In Winters v. United States, supra, the 
Court recognized the tacit reservation of waters from a 
non-navigable stream and sustained an injunction barring 
diversions by up-stream land owners. The reason for the implied 
reservation was that the arid land had been reserved for farming, 
yet the land would be useless for that ~urpose without the 
water from the stream. Assuming that the water had been derived 
from wells this "need" principle would still appear to dictate 
that the Indians had a r eserved right in any water; otherwise 
the reservation of the land would have been useless. 
Second, as has been increasingly recognized in the 
water laws of the Western states, ground water and surface water 
are closely related and interlocking components of the same 
~hydrologic cycle. The National Water Commission points out that: 
Groundwater and surface water are physically 
interrrelated as integral parts of the hydro-
logic cycle. Groundwater basins feed and are 
fed by surface streams. Surface water and 
groundwater are interchangeable for most purposes. 
Wells deplete surface streams. Depletion of 
surface streams depletes water supply to wells. 
Optimum utilization of ground and surface water 
usually involves conjunctive operation by which 
stored ground water supplements and firms up 
the supply of intermittently available stream 
water. Different rules of law dependent on the 
surface or underground point of diversion promote 
and perpetuate misallocation of the resource. 
Corker, Groundwater Law, Management and Administration, National 
Water Commission Legal Study No. 6, pp. xxxiv-xxv (1971). Although 
I certainly am no "hydrologic" expert it does seem to make sense 
6. 
to treat ground water and surface water the same for most 
purposes. Although it may be difficult to determine the source 
of groundwater too much reliance should not be placed on that 
fact since most riparian states, including Nevada, recognize 
and protect appropriate rights to groundwater. Thus, if some 
other neighbor of the Cappaerts were now to drill wells- erroneously 
believing that they would not diminish the flow from the 
Cappaert wells - and so reduced the water level that the Cappaert 
wells could no longer draw, the Cappaerts might then obtain an 
* injunction against the subsequent user under Nevada law. See 
Nev. Rev. Stat. 534.110; In re Waters of Manse Spring, 60 Nev. 
280, 286, 108 P. 2d 311, 314 (1940). 
Admittedly this analogy to state appropriation law is 
not entirely satisfactory for unlike in the case of the United 
States it is less likely that the adversely affected water user 
will not begin to complain about the diversion of his water 
almost immediately after the first diversion occurs. This is so 
because under the prior appropriation theory unless the new user 
has some effect on a prior user's water supply he is entitled to 
* Moreover, as the S.G. points out in his Brief, 
it is not at all clear that the Devils Hole pool should more 
properly be categorized as ground or surface water. Brief for 
United States 32. It has characteristics of both. 
7. 
draw as much water as he wishes and may continue to do so 
without fear that some other party will assert a valid claim to 
all or a portion of his water at some point in the future. The 
special danger represented by the reserved rights doctrine is 
that years of investment development may be wiped out because 
the United States subsequently asserts a claim to the private user's 
water. But although this problem may be aggravated in the context 
of underground water since it is perhaps somewhat more difficult 
to predict the sources of supply, this is not a sufficient reason 
for retaining the current reservation doctrine with respect 
to surface waters but wholly excluding underground water. It 
is, however, a reason for the Court to take special care in this 
case to develop and articulate a more precise standard regarding 
the critical question of ascertaining how much water a 
particular piece of federal land may be said to have reserved 
so that potential private users of water resources can plan 
with some degree of certainty. 
In Arizona v. California, supra, for example, Justice " 
Harlan, in an opinion joined by Justice Stewart, although 
concurring in that part of the majority opinion which allocated 
water to certain Indian reservations, indicated that he did so 
"not without some misgivings regarding the amounts of water 
allocated to the Indian Reservations." 373 U.S. at 603 . (concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). The majority had adopted the 
reasoning of the Master regarding the amount of water intended 
to be reserved: 
He [Master] found that the water was intended 
to satisfy the future as well as the present 
needs of the Indian Reservations and ruled that 
enough water was reserved to irrigate all the 
practically irrigable acreage on the reservations. 
Arizona, on the other hand, contends that the 
quantity of water reserved should be measured 
by the Indians' "reasonably foreseeable needs,' 
which, in fact, means by the number of Indians. 
How many Indians will there be and what their 
future needs can only be guessed. We have 
concluded, as did the Master, that the only 
feasible and fair way by which r e served water for 
the reservations can be measured is by irrigable 
acreage. 
373 U.S. at 600-601. Although it is impossible to ascertain 
8. 
with complete certainty whether Justice Harlan was worried that 
too much or too little water was being allocated to the Indians, 
viewed in context, I think the only reasonable interpretation of 
his statement is that he was concerned that too much water was 
being reserved. Given a vast reservation with only a few Indians 
it does seem that the majority allocation scheme is harsh on 
competing private users. This is particularly so given that 
the Indian population may never use substantial portions of their 
water share yet private investors will be leery of making 
substantial investments dependent upon water that may be claimed 
at some point in the future. Of course this problem might in 
part be alleviated through sales by the Indians of part of their 
water rights to private users. And the majority approach is not 
unreasonable in light of the fact that the reservation doctrine 
turns on the intent of the United States in making the original 
9. 
reservation of land. Assessing such intent in many instances 
is no doubt a hopeless task. In Arizona the majority may have 
felt that even though there were relatively few Indians at the 
time of the creation of the Reservations, the United States likely 
intended the resident tribes to be self-contained and self-
sufficient communities. In order to provide for the tribes 
future development as farmers it was thus reasonable to assume 
that the United States intended to reserve sufficient water to 
make farming possible on all irrigable portions of the Reservations. 
Crops that were not consumed internally might be sold to off-
Reservation consumers in order to obtain cash for the purchase 
of manufactured goods. The majority approach no doubt also 
stems from (1) the unwillingness of the Court to adopt a 
reasonably foreseeable test turning on a factor as speculative 
as Indian population projections and (2) on the preferred 
consideration accorded Indian rights. Moreover, the majority 
approach was appropriate since the test applied there arguably 
created relative certainty in the future with regard to the 
magnitude of the potential Indian water-rights claims throughout 
the West. 
A related consideration that should be touched on 
briefly is the "necessity" branch of the implied reservation 
doctrine. The reserved water must be necessary to accomplish the-
purpose fur which the land was reserved. The important point to 
be derived from the prior opinions of the Court with regard to 
10. 
this factor is that the focus appears to be entirely 
on the needs of the reservation. There is no balancing approach 
evident in any of the cases. Thus, although petitioners in 
part urge that the needs of the private water users somehow 
be balanced against the needs underlying the federal water 
reservation, there is no doctrinal support for this position. 
Moreover, I do not think that the Court should adopt any such -general balancing approach since it would require the federal 
courts to engage in value-laden and largely subjective assessments 
of the competing merits of various water users. If the Court is 
concerned with the effects of the implied reservation doctrine 
on private water users it should instead tightly construe the 
occasions when implied reservations are created and/or take special ---care to limit the quantity of water which it is willing to find 
t reserved in a particular reservation. One alternative would be 
to allow the amount of proof required to establish a reservation ' 
to vary depending upon the nature of the reservation and the 
source of the water. For example, implied reservations in the 
context of Indian lands arguably should be construed more liberally 
than other federal reservations. Similarly, as the amici argue, 
the existence, extent, and flow of groundwaters underneath reserved 
lands likely is far less apparent to Congress at the time of 
withdrawal than in the case of surface waters, and therefore it 
may be more unreasonable to impute to Congress an intent to reserve 
11. 
such waters. 
But although I find the user distinction attractive, 
the surface/ground water distinction seems less appropriate. 
For example, if the United States reserved certain lands for 
an Indian Reservation I do not think there are persuasive 
reasons for applying a stricter burden of proof to showing wh~ther 
the United States intended to reserve sub-surface water. Congress 
no doubt did not know how much underground water potentially was 
available or its sources, but the rationale for the reservation 
of surface waters appears to be equally applicable - the United 
States must have assumed that sufficient water resources were 
obtainable to support the intended agrarian economy. Even the 
reserved user distinction is perhaps of only limited value once 
one moves beyond the narrow category of reservations involving 
Indians since the reservation doctrine is in many respects a 
financial doctrine. The federal government can always obtain 
water rights through its condemnation power. But it will be 
required to compensate existing users for waters diverted. 
I also find the alternatiV€ of carefully limiting 
the quantity of water reserved to be an attractive means of 
limiting the potentially unfair aspects of the implied reservation 
doctrine. For example, in the next decade it is quite likely 
that coal-to-gas conversion plants will become operational in 
certain parts of the Western states, both on Indian and federal 
lands. It is my understanding that these plants will require 
12. 
large qunatities of water. I assume, however, that the prior 
appropriation doctrine will not be used to justify creating 
a prior Indian or federal interest in a sufficient quantity 
of water to operate these plants. Although the reserved rights 
claLmants may no doubt claim that in reserving certain lands 
for Indians the United States intended that enough water be 
reserved to develop all the resources of the reservation I would 
find this an inappropriate extension of the doctrine since it 
would seem manifestly unfair to private water users. Although 
the Arizona Court rejected a "reasonably foreseeable" test 
turning on projected Indian population a foreseeability test 
turning on expected land usage seems appropriate. The Arizona 
( ourt in fact applied a foreseeability test of this type by 
focusing on the number of potentially irrigable acres -
agriculture being the intended use to which the land was to be put 
at the tLme of the reservation. 
II. Intent/Necessity: 
Application of the intent/necessity test must begin 
with consideration of the question whether under The Act for 
the Preservation of American Antiquities, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33, 
President Truman was authorized to reserve the waters contained 
in Devil's Hole in order to protect an endangered species of 
pupfish. This is a very close question. The Antiquities Act 
vests the President with authority to: 
declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, 
historic and prehistoric structures, and other 
objects of historic or scientific interest 
that are situated upon lands owned or controlled 
by the Government of the United States to be 
national monuments .... 
13. 
§ 432. From the face of the statute, particularly when viewed 
in the conjunction with the other operative sections, it is 
difficult to find an intent by Congress to authorize the President ----
to take steps to preserve a species of wildlife, however, rare. 
The brief legislative history of the Act supports an even narrower 
interpretation of its purpose than the language itself. Examination 
of that history reveals that Congress was concerned with the 
preservation of objects of antiquity, mainly the historic and 
·'"' prehistoric ruins of various Indian civilizations located ., 
throughout the Southwest. SeeS. rep. No. 3797, 59th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1906); H.R. Rep. No. 2224, 59th Cong., 1st Sess (1906). 
Despite any difficulty I might have as an original matter in 
construing the Act in a manner so as to justify the implied 
reservation of the water-pupfish habitat a prior decision of 
-------
this Court does appear to advance significantly the argument 
for finding an implied reservation power under the Act. In 
Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920), the Court sustained 
the power of the President under the Antiquitie s Act to establish 
the Grand Canyon National Monument: -
The defendants insist that the monument reserve 
should be disregarded on the ground that there was 
no authority for its creation. To this we cannot 
assent. The act under which the President proceeded 
empowered him to establish reserves embracing "objects 
of historic or scientific int erest." The Grand Canyon, 
as stated in his proclamation, "is an object of 
unusual scientific interest." 
14. 
Id. at 455-56. Although the Grand Canyon is certainly a more 
important and well known object of historic and scientific 
interest than Devil's Hole it is also true that Devil's Hole 
can be fairly characterized as an object of "scientific 
interest" so that its change in status to a monument reserve 
was authorized by the Act. The essential question still remabs, 
however, whether the power to reserve objects of "scientific 
interest" such as the Grand Canyon or Devil's Hole embraced the 
power to reserve the water rights involved here. My current 
feeling is that the power to create an implied reservation of 
water rights is present whenever the presence of the water is 
necessary to ensure one of the prime reasons for the objects' 
scientific value. 
In the case of the Grand Canyon, although the principal 
reason for considering it an object of scientific interest is 
its present configuration as a mile-deep canyon whose walls reveal 
several million years of geologic history, I think that the 
proclamation establishing it as a monument reserve likely can 
; ~ 
also be fairly interpreted as embracing the water flowing 
through the Canyon. This river of water was the driving force 
behind the Canyon's formation and should fairly be regarded as a 
key component of its continuing historical or scientific value 
since it serves as a reminder of the forces which led to the Canyon's 
formation, and more important, contributes to its continued 
deepening. Consequently, application of the implied reservation 
15. 
doctrine to the waters of the Canyon would likely lead to 
the result that the United States could enjoin other users of 
the Colorado River if their activities unduely impeded the 
natural flow of the river. 
A similar chain of logic could be applied to the Devil's 
Hole Proclamation of President Truman. Broadly read the 
Antiquities Act authorized him to reserve objects of scientific 
interest. There is no serious contention that Devil's Hole 
as a geologic formation falls into that category. The issue 
then becomes (1) whether the pool and the resident pupfish are 
key components which make an important contribution to the 
scientific value of Devil's Hole so as to be encompassed within 
the broad power to preserve objects of scientific interest conferred 
by the Antiquities Act and (2) whether President Truman's 
Proclamation, fairly read, can be construed as embracing an 
implied reser vation of sufficient water in the pool for the 
pupfish to survive. My tentative answer to both these questions ' 
is Yes, although I recognize that a defensible opinion could 
be written which reached an opposite result. The first link in 
the chain is the toughest to forge. There is no clear statutory 
language or legislative history to support its creation. Finding 
the power turns on how broadly the Court is willing to interpret 
the power to establish as national monuments "objects of ... 
scientific interest." The Cameron decision appears to support a 
16. 
broad construction of the statute .with regard to the types 
of objects of scientific interest which fairly may be encompassed 
within the Act. And although the petitioners raise a number of 
nonfrivolous contentions with regard to the absence of any 
general power under the Act to take actions with respect to 
wildlife, I do not find them controlling given what I regard 
as the unique linkage between the pool as a geologic formation 
and the continuing existence of the pupfish as its sole inhabitants. 
It is this linkage between the pupfish and the pool which 
establishes Devil's Hole as an object of scientific interest. 
Establishing the second link in the chain is 
substantially easier. The Truman Proclamation in part provided 
that: 
Whereas, there is located outside the 
boundaries of the said monument [Death Valley] 
but in the vicinity thereof a forty-acre tract 
of public land in Nevada containing a remarkable 
underground pool known as Devil's Hole; and 
Whereas, the said pool is a unique subsurface 
remant of the prehistoric chain of lakes which 
in Pleistocene times formed the Death Valley 
Lake System, and is unusual among caverns in 
that it is a solution area in distinctly striated 
limestone, while also owing its formation in part 
to fault action; and 
Whereas the geologic evidence that this sub-




graphic history of the Death Valley region is further 
confirmed by the presence in this pool of a peculiar 
( race of desert fish, and zoologists have demonstrated 
\ that this race of fish, which is found nowhere else 
in the world, evolved only after t e gradual drying 
up of the Death Valley Lake System isolated this fish 
population from the original ancestral stock that in 
Pleistocene times was common to the entire region, and 
Whereas the said pool is of such outstanding 
scientific importance that it should be given 
special protection, and such protection can be 
best afforded by making the said forty-acre 
tract containing the pool a part of the said 
monument .... 
Warning is hereby expressly given to all 
unauthorized persons not to appropriate, injure, 
destroy, or remove any feature of this addition 
to the said monument and not to locate or settle 
on any of the lands thereof. 
17. 
Although it is possible to read the Proclamation so as to protect 
the continued existence of the pool, but not the "peculiar race 
of fish" which is its sole inhabitant, I find that interpretation -
unacceptable. The fate of the pool and the fish are so closely 
intertwined that to speak of protecting the continued existence 
of one without considering the existence of the other is strained. 
To be sure the Proclamation emphasizes "the pool" rather than 
the fish that live in it but preservation of the pool in its 
natural state - a direct purpose of the Act - will also preserve 
the fish.* Indeed, as the S.G. points out, it is difficult 
* Cons ider the fact that even if the linkage of 
the pool and the fish is not accepted, the ability of the fish to 
survive may play a role in the determination of the amount of reserved 
water. The Proclamation clearly indicates an interest in preserving 
the pool. Assuming there is no direct interest in preserving the 
fish, one measure of whether pumping by other water consumers lowers 
the level of the pool an impermissible amount below its original 
or natural level would be the inability of the fish to survive. 
18. 
to think of a reservation that would more clearly carry with it 
a reservation of water rights. Assuming that the validity of 
the conclusions thus far developed, application of the intent/ 
necessity standard inexorably leads to the conclusion that the 
United States intended to reserve sufficient water in the pool 
to ensure the survival of the pupfish. Consequently, the DC 
injunction, which limited pumping from specifically designated 
wells within a two and one-half-mile radius of Devil's Hole 
so as to preserve an adequate water supply for the pupfish was 
entirely appropriate. 
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United States et al. 
On Writs of Certiorari o 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. 
[May -, 1976] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
The question presented in this case is whether the 
reservation of Devil's Hole as a National Monument re~ 
served federal water rights in underground water. 
Devil's Hole is a deep limestone cavern. Approxi-
mately 50 feet below the surface of the cavern is a pool 
65 feet long, 10 feet wide and at least 200 feet deep, al-
though its actual depth is unknown. The pool is a rem-
nant of the prehistoric Death Valley Lake System. By 
the Proclamation of January 17, 1952, President Truman 
withdrew from the public domain a 40-acre tract of land 
surrounding Devil's Hole , making it a detached compo-
nent of the Death Valley National Monument. Proc-
lamation No. 2961, 66 Stat. C18, 17 Fed. Reg. 691.1 The 
1 The final paragraph of the Proclamation withdrawing Devil's 
Hole from the public domam reads as follows: 
"Now, Therefore, I , Harry S. Truman, President of the United 
J '· ' 
' 
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Proclamation was issued under the Act for the Preserva~ 
tion of American Antiquities, 16 U. S. C. § 431, 34 Stat. 
225, which authorizes the President to declare as national 
monuments "objects of historic or scientific interest that 
are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the 
Government of the United States .... " 
The 1952 Proclamation notes that Death Valley was 
set aside as a national monument "for the preservation 
of the unusua.l features of scenic, scientific, and educa~ 
tional interest therein contained." The Proclamation 
also notes that Devil's Hole is near Death Valley and 
contains a "remarkable underground pool." Additional 
preambular statements in the Proclamation explain why 
Devil's Hole was being added to the Death Valley N a-
tiona.! Monument: 
"Whereas the said pool is a unique subsurface 
remnant of the prehistoric chain of lakes which in 
Pleistocene times formed the Death Valley Lake 
System, and is unusual among caverns in that it is 
a solution area in distinctly straited limestone, while 
also owing its formation in part to fault action; and 
"Whereas the geologic evidence that this subter~ 
ranean pool is an integral part of the hydrographic 
States of America, under and by virtue of the authority vested in 
me by section 2 of the act of June 8, 1906, 34 Stat. 225 (16 U.S. C. 
431), do proclaim that, subject to the provisions of the act of Con-
gress approved June 13, 1933, 48 Stat. 139 ( 16 U. S. C. 447), and 
to all valid existing rights, the following-described tract of land in 
Nevada is hereby added to and reserved as a part of the Death 
Valley National Monument, as a detached unit thereof: 
"Mount Diablo Meridian, Nevada T . 17 S., R. 50#., sec. 36, SW 
%. SE 14. 
"Warning is hereby expressly given to all unauthorized persons 
not to appropnate, innure, destroy, or remove any feature of this 
addition to the said monument and not to locate or settle on any 
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history of the Death Valley region is further con-
firmed by the presence in this pool of a peculiar race 
of de~ert fish, and zoologists ha.ve demonstrated that 
this race of fish, which is found nowhere else in the 
world, evolved only after the gradual drying up of 
the Death Valley Lake System isolated this fish 
population from the original ancestr9J stock that in 
Pleistocene times was common to the en tire region; 
and 
"Whereas the said pool is of such outstanding 
scientific importance that it should be given special 
protection, and such protection can be best afforded 
by making the said forty-acre tract containing the 
pool a part of the said monument . ... " 
The Proclamation provides that Devil's Hole should 
be supervised, managed and directed by the National 
Park Service, Department of Interior. Devil's Hole is 
fenced off and only limited 'access is allowed by the Park 
Service. 
The Cappaert petitioners own a 12,000-acre ranch near 
Dcvil's Hole, 4,000 acres of which are used for growing 
Bermuda grass, alfalfa, wheat, and barley; 1,700 to 
1,800 head of cattle are grazed. The ranch represents 
an investment of more than 7 million dollars; it employs 
more than 80 people with an annual payroll of more 
than $340,000. 
In 1968 the Cappaerts began pumping groundwater on 
their ranch on land two and one-half miles from Devil's 
Hole; they were the first owners to appropriate water. 
The groundwater comes from an underground basin or 
acquifer which is also the source of the water in Devil's 
Hole. After the Cappaerts began pumping from the 
wells ncar Devil's Hole, which they do from March to 
October, the summer water level of the pool in Devil's 
Hole began to decrease . Since 1962 the level of water 
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in Devil's Hole has been measured with reference to a 
copper washer installed on one of the walls of the hole 
by the U. S. Geological Survey. Until 1968, the water 
level, with seasonable variations, had been stable at 1.2 
feet below the copper marker. In 1969 the water level 
in Devil's Hole was 2.3 feet below the copper washer; in 
1970, 3.17 feet; in 1971, 3.48 feet; and, in 1972, 3.93 feet. 
When the water is at the lowest levels, a large portion 
of a rock shelf in Devil's Hole is above water. However, 
when the water level is at 3.0 feet below the marker or 
higher, most of the rock shelf is below water, enabling 
algae to grow on it. This in turn enables the desert 
pupfish, referred to in President Truman's Proclamation, 
to spawn in the spring. As the rock shelf becomes ex~ 
posed, the spawning area is decreased, reducing the abil-
ity of the fish to spawn in sufficient quantities to prevent 
extinction. 
In April 1970 the Cappaerts, pursuant to Nevada law, 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.325, applied to the State Engineer, 
Roland D. Westergard, for permits to change the use 
of water from several of their wells. Although the 
United States was not a party to that proceeding and 
was never served, employees of the National Park Serv-
ice learned of the Cappaerts' application through a 
public notice published pursuant to Nevada law. Nev. 
Rev. Stat. § 533.360. An official of the National Park 
Service filed a protest as did a private firm. Nevada 
law permits mterested persons to protest an application 
for a permit; the protest may be considered by the State 
Engineer at a hearing. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.365. A 
hearing was conducted on December 16, 1970, and a field 
solicitor of the Department of Interior appeared on be-
half of the National Park Service. He presented docu-
mentary and testimonial evidence, informing the State 
Engineer that because of the declining water level of 
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Devil's Hole the United States had commissioned a 
study to determine whether the wells on the Cappaerts 
land were hydrologically connected to Devil's Hole and, 
if so, which of those wells could be pumped safely and 
which should be limited to prevent lowering of the water 
level in Devil's Hole. The Park Service field solicitor 
requested either that the Cappaerts' application be de-
nied or that decision on the application be postponed 
until the studies were completed. 
The State Engineer declined to postpone decision. 
At the conclusion of the hearing he stated that there was 
no recorded federal water right with respect to Devil's 
Hole, that the testimony indicated that the Cappaerts' 
pumping would not unreasonably lower the water table 
or adversely affect existing water rights, and that the 
permit would be granted since further economic develop-
ment of the Cappaert's land would be in the public in-· 
terest. In his oral ruling the State Engineer stated in 
part "that the protest to the applications that are the 
subject of this hearing are overruled and the applica-
tions will be issued subject to existing rights." The N a-
tiona! Park Service did not appeal. See N. R. S. 
§ 533.450. 
In August 1971 the United States, invoking 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1345, 62 Stat. 933/ sought an mjunction in the United 
States District Court for the District of Nevada to limit, 
except for domestic purposes, the Cappaerts' pumping 
from six specific wells and from specific locations near 
Devil's Hole. The complaint alleged that the United 
States, in establishing Devil's Hole as part of Death 
2 28 U. S. C . § 1345 provides as follows . 
"Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district 
courts shall have original jurisdictwn of all civil actions, suits or 
proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or 
officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress." 
... 
74-1107 & 74-1304-0PINION 
6 CAPPAERT v. UNITED STATES 
Valley National Monument, reserved the unappropriated 
waters appurtenant to the land to the extent necessary 
for the requirements and purposes of the reservation. 
The complaint further alleged that the Cappaerts had 
no perfected water rights as of the date of the reserva-
tion. The United States asserted that pumping from 
certain of the Cappaerts' wells had lowered the water 
level in Devil's Hole, that the lower water level was 
threatening the survival of a unique species and that 
irreparable harm would follow if the pumping were not 
enjoined. On June 2, 1972, the United States filed an 
amended complaint, adding two other specified wells to 
the list of those to be enjoined. 
The Cappaerts answered, admitting that their wells 
draw water from the same underlying sources supply-
ing Devil's Hole, but denying that the reservation of 
Devil's Hole reserved any water rights for the United 
States. The Cappaerts alleged that the United States 
was estopped from enjoining use of water under land 
which it had exchanged with the Cappaerts. The State 
of Nevada intervened on behalf of the State Engineer 
as a party defendant but raised no affirmative defenses. 
On June 5, 1973, the District Court, by Chief Judge 
Roger D. Foley, entered a preliminary injunction limit-
ing pumping from designated wells so as to return the 
level of Devil's Hole to not more than 3.0 feet below 
the marker. Detailed findings of fact were made and 
the District Judge then appointed a Special Master to 
establish specific pumping limits for the wells and to 
monitor the level of the water at Devil's Hole. The 
District Court found that the water from certain of the 
wells was hydrologically connected to Devil's Hole, that 
the Cappaerts were pumping heavily from those wells, and 
that that pumping had lowered the water level in Devil's 
Hole. The Court found that the pumping could be 
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regulated to stabilize the water level at Devil's Hole and 
that neither establishing an artificial shelf nor trans-
planting the fish was a feasible alternative that would 
preserve the species. The District Court found that if 
the injunction did not issue "there is grave danger that 
the Devil's Hole pupfish may be destroyed, resulting in 
irreparable injury to the United States." 
The District Court then held that in establishing 
Devil's Hole as a National Monument, the President 
reserved appurtenant, unappropriated waters necessary 
to the purpose of the reservation ; the purpose included 
preservation of the pool and the pupfish in it. The 
District Court held that the federal 'Water rights ante-
dated those of the Cappaerts, that the United States was 
not estopped and that the public interest required grant-
ing the injunction. On April 9, 1974, the District Court 
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law sub-
stantially unchanged in a final decree permanently en-
joining pumping that lowers the level of the water 
below the 3.0 foot level. 375 F. Supp. 456 (Nev. 1974). 
The Court M Appeals for the Ninth Circuit· affirmed, 
508 F. 2d 313 ( 1974) ,3 in a thorough opinion by Senior 
District Judge Gus J. Solomon, sitting by designation, 
holding that the implied reser vation of water doctrine 
applied to groundwater as well as to surface water. The 
Court of Appeals held that " [ t] he fundamental purpose 
of the reservation of the Devil's Hole pool was to assure 
that the pool would not suffer changes from its condition 
at the time the Proclamation was issued in 1952 .... " 
508 F . 2d, at 318. The Court of Appeals held that 
3 Pending appeal, the Court of Appeals, in response to a motion 
from the Cappaerts to modify the injunction to permit them to 
pump to 3.7 feet below the copper water level, had permitted the 
Cappaerts to pump so long as the water level did not drop more 
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neither the Cappaerts nor their successors in interest had 
any water rights in 1952, nor was the United States 
estopped from asserting its water rights by exchanging 
land with the Cappaerts. In answer to contentions 
raised by the intervenor Nevada, the Court of Appeals 
held that the United States is not bound by state water 
law as to lands reserved from the public domain and does 
not need to take steps to perfect its rights with the State; 
that the District Court had concurrent jurisdiction with 
he state courts to resolve this claim; and, that the state 
administrative procedures granting the Cappaert's per· 
mit did not bar resolution of the United States' suit in 
Federal District Court. 
We granted the writ of certiorari in this case to con· 
sider the scope of the implied reservation of water rights 
doctrine. 422 U.S. 1041 (1975). We affirm. 
I 
Reserved Water Rights Doctrine 
This Court has long held that when the Federal Gov· 
ernment withdraws its land from the public domain and 
reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by 
implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappro· 
priated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose 
of the reservation. Reservation of water rights is em· 
powered by the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, which 
permits federal regulations of navigable streams, and the 
Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3, which permits federal 
regulation of federal lands. The doctrine applies to 
Indian reservations and other federal enclaves, encom· 
passing water rights in navigable and nonnavigable 
streams. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. 
United States,- U.S.-, [p. 4] (1976); United Sbt/$s 
v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U. S. 520, ~22-
523 ( 1971); Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546, 601 
.,;, 
.. , 
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(1963); FPC v. Oregon, 349 U. S. 435 (1955); United 
States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939); Winters v. United 
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) .4 
Nevada argues that the cases establishing the doctrine 
of federal reserved water rights articulate an equitable 
doctrine calling for a balancing of competing interests. 
However, an examination of those cases shows they do not 
analyze the doctrine in terms of a balancing test. For 
example, in Winters v. United States, supra, the Court 
did not mention the use made of the water by the up-
stream landowners in sustaining an injunction barring 
their diversions of the water. The "Statement of the 
Case" in Winters notes that the upstream users were 
homesteaders who had invested heavily in dams to divert 
the water to irrigate their land, not an unimportant in-
terest. The Court held that when the Federal Govern-
ment reserv·es land, by implication it reserves water 
rights sufficient to accomplish the purposes of the 
reservation. ~ 
In determining ·whether there is a federally reserved 
water right implicit in a federal reservation of public 
4 The Cappaerts argue that as to nonnavigable waters, the implied 
reservation doctrine properly applies only to Indian reservations due 
to ,the sovereign nature and ward statu~ of Indian tribes; thus, FPC 
v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955), must be overruled. We disagree. 
Navigability or nonnav1gability of water is Irrelevant for the appli-
cation of the implied reservatiOn doctrine, see ante, at [29, this· 
copy] . This court has ·held that the doctrine applies both to In-
dian reservations and other federal enclave:;. E. g., A.rizona v. 
Califorma, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). 
G Nevada IS askmg, m effect, that the Court overrule Arizona v. 
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), and United States v. District Court 
for the County of Eagle, 401 U. S. 520 (1971), to the extent that 
they hold that the Implied reservation doctrine applies to all federal 
enclaves since in so holding those cases did not balance the "compet-
mg equities:" Nevada's Brief, at 15. However, since balancing the 
'equities is not the test, tho&J cases need not be disturbed. 
,· 
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land, the issue is whether the Government intended to 
reserve iinappropilated: and tnus availaore- water. I n-
te"iit IS inferred ii1he previo~ unappropriated waters 
are necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the 
reservation was created. See, e. g., Arizona v. California, 
373 U.S., at 599-601; Winters v. United States, 207 U.S., 
at 576. Both the District Court and Court of Appeals 
held that the 1952 Proclamation expressed an intention 
to reserve unappropriated water and we agree.6 The 
Proclamation discussed the pool in Devil's Hole in four 
of the five preambles and recited that the "pool . . . 
should be given special protection." Since a pool is a 
body of water, the protection contemplated is mean" 
ingful only if the water remains; the water right re-
served by the 1952 Proclamation was thus explicit, not 
implied.7 
Also explicit in the 1952 Proclamation is the authority 
of the Director of the Park Service to manage the lands 
of Devil's Hole Monument "as provided in the act of 
Congress entitled 'An Act to establish a National Park 
Service, and for other purposes,' approved August 25, 1916 
(39 Stat. 535; 16 U. S. C. 1-3) .... " The National 
Park Service Act provides that the "fundamental purpose 
of said national parks, monuments, and reservations" is 
"to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic 
objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the 
6 The implied reservation of water doctrine applies only to un-
appropnated waters . The water rights at issue here were unappro-
priated m 1952 since neither the Cappaerts nor their successors in 
interest had beneficially diverted any water as of that date. See n. 
8, infra. 
7 The 1952 Proclamation forbids unauthorized persons to "appro-
priate, mure, destroy, or remove any feature" from the reservation. 
Since water is a "feature" of the reservation, the Cappaerts, by their 
pumping, are m a sense "appropnating" or "removing" this feature 
in violation of the Proclamation 
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enjoyment of the same in such manner and· by such 
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment 
of future generations." 16 U. S. C. § 1. 
The implied reservation of water doctrine, however, 
reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill 
the purpose of the reservation, no more. Arizona v. 
California, 373 U. S., at 600-601. Here the purpose of 
the reservation is preservation of the pool. Devil's Hole 
Monument was reserved "for the preservation of the 
unusual features of scenic, scientific, and educational in-
terest." The Proclamation notes that the pool contains 
"a peculiar race of desert fish ... which is found nowhere 
else in the world" and that the "pool is of ... outstand-
ing scientific importance .... " The pool need only be 
preserved, consistent with the intention expressed in the 
Proclamation, to the extent that its scientific interest is 
preserved. The fish are one of the features of scientific 
interest. The preamble noting the scientific interest of 
the pool follows the preamble describing the fish as 
unique; the Proclamation must be read in its entirety. 
Thus, as the District Court has correctly determined, the 
level of the pool may be permitted to drop to the extent 
that the drop does not impair the scientific value of the 
pool as the natural habitat of the species sought to be 
preserved. The District Court thus tailored its injunc-
tion, very appropriately, to minimal need, curtailing 
pumping only to the extent necessary to preserve an ade-
quate water level at Devil's Hole, thus implementing 
the stated objectives of the Proclamation. 
Both petitioners argue that even if the intent of the 
1952 Proclamation were to maintain the pool, the Act 
for the Protection of American Antiquities, 34 Stat. 225, 
16 U. S. C. §§ 431-433, did not give the President author-
ity to reserve a pool. Under that Act, according to the 
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lands only to protect archeologic sites. However, thE( 
ianguage of the Act which authorizes the President to 
proclairr;_ as national monuments "historic landmarks, 
historic and prehistoric structures, and objects of historic 
or scientific interest that are situated upon the land~ 
pwned or controlled by the Government" is not so lim.:r 
ited. The pool in Devil's Hole and its rare inhabitant~ 
~re "objects of historic and scientific interest." See gen; 




No cases of this Court have applied the doctrine of 
implied reservation of ~ater rights to groundwater. 
Nevada argues that the implied reservation doctrine is 
limited to surface water. To recognize such a distinc-/ 
tion, however, would be to_ exalt form over substance 
since "groundwater and surface water are physically in.., 
terrelated as integral parts of the hydrologic cycle." 
Corker, Groundwater lfaw, Management and Admin-
jstration, National Water Commission Legal Study No. 
6, p. xxiv (1971). Depletion of water from one sourc~ 
will deplete .it from the other. Ibid. See also Water 
Policies for the Future-Final Report to the President 
and to the Congress of the United States by the Na-
tional Water Commission 233 (1973). For example
1 
Nevada itself must recognize the interrelationship since 
it applies the law of prior appropriation to both ground-
water and surface water. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 533.010 et 
seq. ; 534.020; 534.080; 534.090.8 See also State v. Dar-
8 Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, the first to divert. 
and use water beneficially establishes a right to continued use of 
the water. The right exists only as long as the water is bene-
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ity, 55 N. M. 12, 27, 225 P. 2d 1007, 1016 ( 1950), ap-
peal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question 
sub nom. Dority v. New Mexico ex rel. Bliss, 341 U. S, 
924 (1951). Thus, since the implied reservation of 
water doctrine is based on the necessity of water for 
the purpose of the federal reservation and since ground-· 
water and surface water are interrelated, we hold that 
the existence of the water right does not vary as the 
source of the water varies.0 
III 
State Law 
Both petitioners argue that the Federal Government 
must perfect its implied water rights according to state 
law. They contend that the Desert Land Act of 1877, 
19 Stat. 377, 43 U. S. C. § 321 and its predecessors 1 () 
United States, - U. S. -, [3-4] (1976). Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 533.010 et seq.; 534.020; 534.080; 534.090. Sax, Water Law, 
Planning and Policy-Ca.~es and Materials, 218-224 (1968). 
9 Both petitioners argue that the effect of applying the implied 
reservation doctrine to groundwater is to prohibit pumping from 
the entire 4500 acres above tho aquifer which supplies water to 
Devil's Hole. First, it must be emphasized that the injunction 
limits but does not prohibit pumping.~ Second, the finclings of 
fact in this case relate only to wells within two and one-half miles 
of Devil's Hole. No proof was introduced in the District Court 
that pumping from the same aquifer which supplies Devil's Hole, 
but at a greater distance from Devil's Hole, would significantly 
lower the level in Devil's Hole. Nevada notes that such pumping 
"will in t1me affect the water level in Devil's Hole." Brief, at 25. 
There was testimony from a research hydrologist that substantial 
pumping 40 miles away "over a period of decades [would have] a 
small effect." Appendix, at 79. 
10 The predece8sors to the Desert Land Act of 1877, 19 Stat. 377, 
43 U. S. C. § 321, are the Act of July 26, 1866, 14 Stat. 251, and 
the Act of July 9, 1870, 16 Stat. 217. Those Acts provide that 
water rights vested under state Jaw or custom are protected. How~ 
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severed nonnavigable water from public land, subjecting 
it to state law. That Act, however, provides only that 
water rights on public land-land that is either patented 
to a private homesteader or patentable but not re-
served-are to be acquired by prior appropriation as de-
termined by state law. California Oregon Power Co. v. 
Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142, 154-
155 (1935); see Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts Over 
Western Waters-A Decade of Attempted "Clarifying 
Legislation," 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 423, 432 (1966).11 This 
Court held in FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955), 
ever, the Cappaerts did not have any vested water rights in 1952. 
See n. 6, supra. 
11 The cases relied upon by the Cappaerts are not to the contrary. 
E. g., United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725 
(1950); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82 (1937); California Oregon 
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 275 U. S. 142 (1935). 
Dority v. New Mexico ex rel. Bliss, 341 U. S. 924 (1951). None 
involve a federal reservation and all involve a determination 
whether wa,ter rights had vested under state law. Here a Federal 
reservation is involved and neither the Cappaerts nor their prede-
cessors in interest had any vested water rights in 1952 when the 
United Statet!water rights vested. 
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589 (1945), also relied upon 
by the Cappaerts, involved a federal reservation pursuant to the 
Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, 32 Stat. 388, which directs the 
Secretary of Interior to "proceed in conformity with [State] 
laws" ' a.nd which provides that "the right to the use of wa.ter ac-
quired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the 
land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, 
and the limit of the right." In Nebraska v. Wyoming, the court 
noted that the United States had acted in conformity with state 
law. The court said, "We intimate no opinion whether a different 
procedure might ha.ve been followed so as to appropriate and re-
serve to the United States all of these water rights. No such at-
tempt was made." 325 U. S., at 615. Here the United States 
acquired reserved water rights through a reservation authorized 
not by the Reclamation Act, but by the Antiquities Act. 
J" 
> .. 
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under 28 U. S. C. § 1345 to adjudicate the water rights· 
claims of the United States.'8 Colorado River Water 
Conservation District v. United States,- U. S., at [5-· 
8]. · The McCarran amendment, 43 U. S. C. § 666, 66; 
Stat. 560, did not repeal § 1345 jurisdiction as applied to 
water rights. Ibid. Nor, as Nevada suggests, is the . 
McCarren amendment a substantive statute, requiring: 
tbe United. States to "perfect its water rights in the 
state forum like all other land owners." Nevada's Brief, 
at 37. The McCarren amendment merely waives 
United States' sovereign immunity should the United. 
States be joined as a party in a state court general water 
rights' adjudication. Colorado River Water Conserva-· 
t'ion District v. United States, - U. S., at [p. 6-7] .· 
VI 
Res Judicata 
Finally Nevada, as intervenor in the Cappaerts' suit,. 
argued in the Court of Appeals that the United States· 
was barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel from 
litigating its water rights claim in federal court. Ne-
vada bases this conclusion on the fact that the National 
Park Service filed a protest to the Cappaerts' pumping· 
permit application in the state administrative proceed-
ing. Since we reject that contention, we need not con-
sider whether the issue was timely and properly raised. 
We note only that the United States was not made a 
party to the state administrative proceeding; 14 nor was· 
the United States in privity with the Cappaerts. ~lee' 
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illi-
nois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 320-326 (1911). Wher:t 
uSee n. 2, supra. 
14 The cases petitioners rely upon involve parties who have coi~ 
iatera.lly attacked an administrative determination. Here the 
Uhited States was never a party. 
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the United States appeared to protest in the state pro-
ceeding it did not assert any federal water right claims, 
nor did it seek to adjudicate any cla.ims until the hydro-
logical studies as to the effects of the Cappaerts' pump-
ing had been completed.1 " The fact that the United 
States did not attempt to adjudicate its water rights in 
the state proceeding is not significant since the United 
States was not a party. The State Water Engineer's 
decree explicitly stated that it was "subject to existing 
rights"; thus, the issue raised in the District Court was 
not decided in the proceedings before the State Engineer. 
See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of 
Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S., at 323. Cf. United States 
v. Utah Construction & Mi,ning Co., 384 U. S. 394, 422. 
We hold, therefore, that as of 1952 when the United 
States reserved Devil's Hole, it acquired by reservation, 
water rights in unappropriated appurtenant ground-
water sufficient to maintain the level of the pool to pre-
serve its historic value and thereby implement Proc-
lamation No. 2961. Accordingly, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
15 The United States requested either that the permits be denied 
or decision postpom'd until the studies were complete. While the 
State Engineer did not postpone deci, ion on the permit application, 
the Cappacrts' attorney ~a id that the ,;tudies "w111 go forward 
whether or not the applications are granted; so let's not make 
the mistake of thinking that if the.::~e applications are granted the 
studies are moot, they alr(' .ooi .'' App, 307. 
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Court in these cases. 
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May 24, 1976 
Re: Nos. 74-1107 & 74-1304 - Cappaert v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
Except for Part II dealing with ground water, I am in 
substantial agreement with your circulating opinion in this 
case. As to Part II, however, it seems unnecessary to go 
farther than holding that reserved water rights may not be 
defeated by a subsequent appropriation of ground water on 
which the reserved rights are shown to depend. I would pre-
fer to avoid laying down the general proposition that because 
"ground water and surface water are interrelated--the exist-
ence of the water right -does not vary as the source of the 
water varies." 
Ground and surface water are not always interrelated; 
and where they are not, I would withhold opinion on whether a 
shortage of surface water in dry years may be cured by drill-
ing and pumping or diverting unrelated ground water to the 
detriment of prior rights dependent on that water. Query, 
for example: whether water rights impliedly reserved by the 
creation of an Indian reservation would give the United States 
and its wards the right to drill for and appropriate ground 
water that until that time had no surface manifestation but 
has been subject to prior appropriation by those owning non-
reservation land beneath which the underground pool or stream 
also lies or runs. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to Conference 
P.S. The attached article from a country newspaper in Colo-
rado indicates the immediate impact of our recent 
decisions on the allocation of a scarce resource, as 
well as the proclivity of some government agencies to 
attempt to turn an inch into a mile. 
B.R.W. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
-j;n.pr.etttt Qfmtrlllf t:Irt ~tb ;§taits 
jiufring~ ~. QJ. 2llp'!$ I 
May 25, 1976 
Re: Nos. 74-1107 & 74-1304 - Cappaert v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
I agree with Byron's observations about this case, 
including his comments about Part II. 
Sincerely, ~~ 
l~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
.. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
;§u:prtmt QJ'cttd cf tltt ~ttittb ;§tldtg 
'ifagltittghrtt. ill. OJ. 2ll?)!.;l 
May 28, 1976 
RE: Nos. 74-1107 & 74-1304 Cappaert and Nevada ex rel. 




The Chief Justice 





CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.:§ttp"tmtt <!Jtntrlttf t.It.t ~ttit.tb' ~fattg 
~M!rittghm. ~. <!J. 2ll.;tJ.1.;l 
May 31, 
Re: No. 74-1107 Cappaertv. UnitedStates 
No. 74-1304 - Nevada v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your recirculation of May 28. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 






~u:p-rmtt <!f~urt ~f flrt ~b ,jtattg 
Jl':t6fringhttt. ~. <If. 2ll~J!.~ 
C HAMBERS Or 
JUSTIC E BYRON R . WHITE 
June 2, 1976 
Re: Nos. 74-1107 & 74-1304 - Cappaert v. U. S. 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 
Copies to Conference 
j 
' . 
;%upuutt <!fcttrl of tfrt ~b ~hdts 
1llasqingUt1t. 10. <!f. 20,?'1~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 2, 1976 
He: No. 74-1107 -- Cappaert v. United States 
No. 74-1304 -- Nevada v. United States 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
I 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
;§u.prttttt QfO'Url o-f tltt ~tb ;§bdr.o-
jilas!p:n:gton. ~. "f. 2llp~~ 
June 3, 1976 
) 
Re: Nos. 74-1107 &.74-1304 - Cappaert v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
l 
The Chief Justice 





THE C. J. Jli. li!! . i8. W. J. B. P. S. B. R. W. T . M. H. A. B. L. F. P . W. H. R. 
//z.~/7~ 
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